Sense-data
Russell defines sense-data
as the things that are immediately known in sensation, such as
colors, sounds, smells etc. With "sensation" he means something that
you do, an experience, and he thereafter exemplifies the object of the
experience (i.e. the table) as sense-data. I believe he brings up the notion of
sense-data to ask questions like how we perceive and define
"physical objects". This then leads to the question of what
"matter" really is. Is there such a thing at all, and if so, what is
its nature? Sense-data lay the foundation on which Russell develop his thoughts
on philosophy.
Proposition and statement
of fact
A statement of fact can be
described as a proposition that most people consider valid. Although this
proposition that is considered a fact may not always be true or correct;
different people have different opinions. A proposition must consist of
components that we are acquainted with, i.e. we have experienced it and know
its sense-data, in order for us to fully understand it (to be able to call it a
statement of fact). This all relates to Russell points about the
difference between the knowledge of things and the knowledge
of truths.
The difference between
"statement of fact" and "proposition" in relation to other
verbal expressions is that they addresses some sense of reality. They are
applicable to our notion of reality and can be evaluated based on that.
Definite description
Firstly, Russell defines a
ambiguous description as "so-and-so". He then proceeds to define the
definite description as "the so-and-so". To exemplify
this you could say that "a ball" is a ambiguous description where as
"the golden ball (ballon d'Or)" is a definite description.
Russell then concludes that
knowledge by (definite) description enables us as individuals to pass beyond
the limit of our private experience. This means that we can construct a sense
on meaning to (physical) objects that that we have not yet experienced (we have
no sense-data about it).
Knowledge (epistemology)
One point that Russell make
is about derivative and intuitive knowledge of truth. He concludes that most of
what we know should be considered probable opinion, i.e. something that we
believe to be true because it is derived from something which has not the
highest degree of self-evidence, i.e. things that we know by acquaintance
a complex fact consisting of certain terms in a certain relation.
I believe Russell means
that derivative knowledge is some thing that we know where the known conditions are known
intuitively. Intuitive knowledge can be valid because of its degree of
self-evidence. Our acquaintances with sense-data and how we perceive
things are very self-evident.
He
proceeds to talk about the nature of "things", or rather a things
"nature", and that you cannot understand a the nature of a specific
"thing" if you do not know the "things" relation to every
other "thing" in the universe. He means that acquaintance of a
thing does not involve a knowledge of its relations and a knowledge of some relations does not imply knowledge
of all its relations, and therefore nor a
knowledge of its "nature". As an example, one might
be acquainted with the use of Internet without knowing all about its
nature, as a computer scientist might do.
You talk about definite description and how it can help us to refer to things to which we have yet to experienced sense-data from. I believe that this could be a fundamental part of how we, Humans, can talk about things we yet do not know anything about, to ponder about things that might and might not exist. Could it be this concept of thought that separates us from other living organisms? Do you agree with me?
SvaraRaderaUnfortunately, we can't ask non-human animals what they think about it.. ;)
RaderaHej Carl! I think you summarised the theme very good with your text. However, I would like to question your view on how statements of facts and propositions differ from other verbal expressions. You write that the difference is that they in some sense address reality. Aren't there a lot of other verbal expressions that also address reality? Isn't our entire language referring to reality in some sense or is it only like in Platon's cave metaphor that it's just a mere "shadow" of reality?
SvaraRaderaOne may argue that language is everything. If so wouldn't say colour exist without a word (or another semantic referrent) for it? Some languages have the same word for green and blue. Does that mean that it is the same colour?
Cheers!